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1 Introduction
Households’ expectations about their future income affect their consumption and fi-
nancial behavior and should be shaped by perceptions of both idiosyncratic and aggregate
risk. Policymakers attach an important role to the macroeconomic outlook of households,
and low consumer confidence about the aggregate economy is central to many accounts
of the slow recovery of consumption after the Great Recession. However, aggregate risk
only accounts for a small fraction of the total income risk faced by households. Macroe-
conomic models of imperfect information therefore predict that households are typically
uninformed about news that are relevant for the macroeconomic outlook (Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt, 2015; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003). This raises two questions: First, are relevant
pieces of news about the macroeconomy, such as professional forecasts about economic
growth, part of households’ information sets? Second, do households adjust their expec-
tations about their own economic situation and their behavior in response to changes in
their expectations about aggregate economic growth?
In this paper, we use experimental methods to test for the causal effects of house-
holds’ expectations about future macroeconomic conditions on their personal economic
prospects and behavior.1 We propose a randomized information experiment embedded
in an online survey on a sample that is representative of the portion of the US popula-
tion that is employed full-time. Our experiment proceeds as follows: first, we elicit our
respondents’ prior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession. We define a recession as a
fall in US real GDP around three months after the time of the survey. Subsequently, we
provide our respondents with one of two truthful professional forecasts about the likeli-
hood of a recession taken from the micro data of the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF). Respondents in the“high recession treatment”receive information from a very pes-
simistic forecaster, while respondents in the “low recession treatment” receive a prediction
from a very optimistic forecaster. Thereafter, we measure our respondents’ expectations
1 Identifying this causal channel is important as research shows that people’s personal
situation affects their macroeconomic expectations (e.g., see Kuchler and Zafar (2018)).
Further, omitted variables could affect both macroeconomic and personal expectations.
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about the evolution of aggregate unemployment and their personal economic situation
over the 12 months after the survey, and elicit both their consumption plans as well as
their posterior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession. We re-interview a subset of our
respondents in a follow-up survey two weeks after the information provision.
Our experimental design allows us to study whether people adjust their personal job
loss and earnings expectations and their economic behavior in response to changes in
their macroeconomic outlook. Moreover, the setup enables us to shed light on different
predictions of macroeconomic models of imperfect information, which parsimoniously
explain many stylized facts in macroeconomics (Carroll et al., 2018; Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt, 2015) and dramatically change policy predictions relative to standard models
(Wiederholt, 2015). In such models, people are imperfectly informed about the state of
the economy, due to either infrequent updating of information sets (Carroll, 2003; Mankiw
and Reis, 2006; Reis, 2006) or receiving noisy signals (Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2015;
Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003). For example, an adjustment of our respondents’ beliefs
in response to the information implies that they are imperfectly informed about the
professional forecasts, even though those forecasts are relevant for their economic outlook.
We document several findings on people’s recession expectations and their relationship
to people’s personal economic outlook and behavior: first, we find that our respondents
have much more pessimistic and dispersed prior beliefs about the likelihood of a reces-
sion compared with professional forecasters. Respondents update their beliefs about the
likelihood of a recession in the direction of the forecasts, putting a weight of around one
third on the forecast. Among those with a college degree, learning rates are significantly
higher for respondents who are less confident in their prior beliefs, in line with Bayesian
updating. For those without a college degree, there is no such heterogeneity. The findings
for highly educated respondents are in line with models of imperfect information in which
people are initially inattentive but update rationally after receiving new information.
Second, we explore the degree of extrapolation from recession expectations to personal
economic expectations. We find that a negative macroeconomic outlook has a negative
causal effect on people’s subjective financial prospects for their household and increases
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their perceived chance of becoming personally unemployed. A back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation suggests that 11.3 percent of our respondents would need to become unemployed
in case of a recession for their expectations to be accurate on average. This effect is large,
but still relatively close to the increase in the job loss rate by 7 percentage points during
the last recession. However, there is no significant average effect on people’s expected
earnings growth conditional on keeping their job. In the two-week follow-up survey, dif-
ferences in expectations decrease in size, but mostly remain economically and statistically
significant.
Third, we characterize heterogeneity in the effect of recession expectations on per-
sonal expectations. The negative effect on perceived job security is driven by individuals
with a higher exposure to past recessions, such as people with lower education and lower
earnings, as well as men. Individuals who are more strongly exposed to macroeconomic
risk (e.g. those with previous unemployment experience, those living in counties with
higher unemployment, or those working in more cyclical industries) more strongly up-
date their expectations about personal unemployment. Similarly, we provide evidence
of updating of earnings expectations conditional on working in the same job for groups
that should not be constrained by downward rigidity in wages. Thus, the updating of
personal expectations is data-consistent in terms of size and heterogeneity, indicating
that our respondents have an understanding of their actual exposure to recessions. The
assumption that people understand the true model of the economy is a key feature of
imperfect information models.
Fourth, we provide evidence of adjustments in behavior in response to the informa-
tion. We find that a more pessimistic macroeconomic outlook causes a significantly lower
planned consumption growth, in line with recent evidence that recessions can entail shocks
to permanent income (Krueger et al., 2016; Yagan, 2018). Furthermore, we document
surprisingly large effects of our treatment on active adjustments in people’s stockholdings
between the main intervention and the follow-up survey, measured with self-reports.
Finally, we provide causal evidence on the relationship between people’s expectations
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about economic growth and inflation.2 There was substantial disinflation during most
past recessions (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015b) and many macroeconomic models
predict a co-movement of inflation and unemployment in response to shocks. However, our
fifth main finding is that exogenous changes in beliefs about the likelihood of a recession
do not decrease people’s inflation expectations.
We contribute to a growing literature that uses survey experiments to study the expec-
tation formation process and the importance of information rigidities. This literature has
mainly focused on expectations about inflation (Armantier et al., 2016, 2015; Binder and
Rodrigue, 2018; Cavallo et al., 2017; Coibion et al., 2018a) and house prices (Armona
et al., 2018; Fuster et al., 2018), documenting that consumers and firms update their
expectations in response to the provision of publicly available information. Our paper
is the first to exogenously shift households’ expectations about future GDP growth to
assess whether people extrapolate from expectations about aggregate conditions to their
personal economic outlook, and whether these expectations causally affect consumer and
financial behavior. A key contribution of our paper is to document that updating of
personal expectations in response to a revised macroeconomic outlook is driven by those
groups who are actually more strongly exposed to macroeconomic risk, suggesting that
households have a basic understanding of their exposure to business cycle fluctuations.
A larger literature uses observational data to study how people’s macroeconomic ex-
pectations are formed (Das et al., 2018; Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart, 2019; Kuchler
and Zafar, 2018; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016; Manski, 2017; Mian et al., 2018;
Tortorice, 2012), and how these expectations shape household behavior, such as the ef-
fect of home price expectations on housing-related behavior (Bailey et al., 2018a,b) or
the effect of inflation expectations on consumption behavior (Bachmann et al., 2015;
D’Acunto et al., 2018a). A literature in finance uses survey data to study the extent to
2 We build upon work examining how beliefs about unemployment correlate with beliefs
about interest rates and inflation (Carvalho and Nechio, 2014; Dra¨ger et al., 2016;
Kuchler and Zafar, 2018). Andre et al. (2019) measure respondents’ beliefs about how
unemployment and inflation change in response to different macroeconomic shocks.
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which optimism and pessimism about stock returns and the macroeconomic outlook can
explain households’ investment behavior (Das et al., 2018; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014;
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). In a different context, namely
managerial decision-making, Coibion et al. (2018b) provide causal evidence showing that
higher inflation expectations lead firms to raise their prices, increase their utilization of
credit, and reduce their employment.
Our paper also contributes to a literature that uses observational data to study the im-
portance of information rigidities in macroeconomics (Carroll, 2003; Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko, 2012, 2015a; Mankiw et al., 2003).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the design of the
main experiment and provides details on the data collection. In Section 3, we present
evidence on belief updating in response to the professional forecasts. Section 4 presents
the results on the causal effect of expectations about a recession on people’s personal
economic outlook, behavior and other macroeconomic expectations. We provide various
robustness checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design
In this section we describe the survey administration, present our experimental design
and explain the structure of the main survey and the follow-up survey. The full experi-
mental instructions for all experiments (including robustness experiments 1, 2, and 3) are
available at https://goo.gl/1C9vLK. Figures A.1 and A.2 show detailed timelines of the
experiment and the relevant reference periods for behavioral outcomes and expectations.
2.1 Survey
We collect a sample of 1,124 respondents that is representative of the full-time em-
ployed US population in terms of gender, age, region and total household income through
the widely used market research company “Research Now”. We only invite people who
both have a paid job and work full-time. The data were collected in the summer of
2017. We conducted the follow-up survey approximately two weeks after the main survey
was administered and managed to recontact 737 respondents, which corresponds to a
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recontact rate of 65 percent.
2.2 Baseline experiment
Prior beliefs: Likelihood of a recession First, we ask subjects to complete a ques-
tionnaire on demographics, which includes questions on gender, age, income, education,
and region of residence. Subsequently, we give our respondents a brief introduction on
how to probabilistically express expectations about future outcomes, and also explain
several relevant economic concepts, such as “recession” and “GDP”. Then, we ask our
respondents to estimate the likelihood that there will be a fall in US real GDP in the
fourth quarter of 2017 compared to the third quarter of 2017. The survey was conducted
in the summer of 2017, so this corresponds to a fall in real GDP three to six months after
the survey.3 Thereafter, we ask our respondents how confident they are in their estimate.
Information treatment: Professional forecasters The Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia regularly collects and publishes predictions by professional forecasters about
a range of macroeconomic variables in their Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
(Croushore, 1993). The SPF is conducted in the middle of each calendar quarter, and
forecasters have to estimate the likelihood of a decline in real GDP in the quarter of the
survey as well as each of the four following quarters. The average probability assigned to
a drop in GDP in the quarter after the survey has had high predictive power for actual
recessions in the past. In our survey we randomly assign our respondents to receive
one of two forecasts taken from the microdata of the wave of the SPF conducted in the
second quarter of 2017, the most recent wave of the SPF available at the time of our
survey. To make the forecast more meaningful to respondents, we tell them that it comes
from a financial services provider that regularly participates in a survey of professional
forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
In the “high recession treatment”, respondents receive a forecast from the most pes-
3 One concern could be that quarterly GDP also fell outside actual recessions in the
past, so eliciting beliefs about this outcome could not really capture beliefs about the
likelihood of a recession. However, a fall in US real GDP in the fourth quarter happened
only during actual recessions since World War II.
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simistic panelist in the SPF, who assigns a 35 percent probability to a fall in US real
GDP in the fourth quarter compared to the third quarter of 2017. In the “low recession
treatment”, respondents receive information from one of the most optimistic forecasters,
who expects a fall in US real GDP with a probability of 5 percent.4 In order to make
the treatment more meaningful to our respondents, we provide them with a figure that
contrasts their prior belief with the prediction from the professional forecaster (see Figure
A.3 for an illustration of the treatment screen).
Personal expectations, economic behavior, and macroeconomic expectations
After the information provision all respondents are asked to estimate the likelihood that
the unemployment rate in the US will increase over the 12 months after the survey, as well
as a qualitative question on how they expect unemployment to change. This is followed
by questions on personal economic expectations, other macroeconomic expectations and
their consumption plans. While we elicit most expectations probabilistically, we also
include some qualitative questions with categorical answer options.5
We first ask our respondents whether they think that their family will be better or
worse off 12 months after the survey. Subsequently, we elicit people’s density forecast
about their earnings growth conditional on working at the same place where they cur-
rently work. We ask our respondents to assign probabilities to ten brackets of earnings
growth over the next 12 months, which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Respondents could not continue to the next screen if the entered probabilities did not
sum up to 100 percent. The elicitation of a subjective probability distribution allows us
to measure both mean expected earnings growth and uncertainty about earnings growth.6
4 The professional forecasts correspond to SPF panelists’ beliefs about a drop in real
GDP two quarters after this wave of the SPF was conducted.
5 The question framing we use to elicit people’s expectations closely follows the New
York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE). The question framing was opti-
mized after extensive testing (Armantier et al., 2017) and follows the guidelines on the
measurement of subjective expectations by Manski (2017).
6 Means of density forecasts are easy to interpret, while point forecasts could capture
mean, mode or some other moment of our respondents’ subjective probability distri-
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Thereafter, respondents estimate their subjective probability of job loss and their subjec-
tive probability of finding a new job within three months in case they lose their job over
the next 12 months. In addition, we elicit density forecasts of inflation over the next 12
months using the same methodology as for earnings expectations.7
Subsequently, we ask our respondents some qualitative questions related to their con-
sumption behavior. First, we ask them whether they think that it is a good time to
buy major durable goods. Second, our respondents are asked how they plan to adjust
their consumption expenditures on food at home, food away from home and leisure ac-
tivities during the four weeks after the survey compared to the four weeks prior to the
survey. Thereafter, our respondents answer a qualitative question on how they expect
firm profits to change over the next 12 months, and they estimate the percent chance that
unemployment in their county of residence will increase over the next 12 months. Finally,
we re-elicit beliefs about the likelihood of a fall in real US GDP in the fourth quarter of
2017 compared to the third quarter of 2017. At the end of the survey, our respondents
complete a series of additional questions on the combined dollar value of their spending
on food at home, food away from home, clothing and leisure activities over the seven days
before the survey, the industry in which they work and their tenure at their employer, as
well as a set of questions measuring their financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).
Moreover, we ask them a series of questions on their assets, their political affiliation as
well as their zipcode of residence.
2.3 Follow-up survey
We designed our main survey to minimize concerns about numerical anchoring and
experimenter demand. First, instead of eliciting posterior beliefs about the likelihood
of a recession immediately after the information provision, respondents first answer a
butions (Engelberg et al., 2009).
7 We ask our respondents about inflation, as done in the New York Fed’s Survey of
Consumer Expectations, instead of changes in the general price level, as done in the
Michigan Survey of Consumers. Asking consumers to think about prices results in more
extreme and disagreeing self-reported inflation expectations (de Bruin et al., 2011).
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range of other questions and only report posteriors at the end of the survey, roughly
10 minutes after the information. Second, we elicit both probabilistic and qualitative
expectations to ensure the robustness of our findings to different question framing and
numerical anchoring. While we believe that these design features already address some
concerns regarding numerical anchoring, we further mitigate such concerns by conducting
a two-week follow-up survey in which no additional information is provided. We chose to
have a two-week gap between the main study and the follow-up to balance the trade-off
between testing for persistence and maximizing the recontact rate in the follow-up.
In the follow-up survey, we re-elicit some of the key outcomes from the main survey,
such as the likelihood of increases in national- and county-level unemployment, expecta-
tions about firm profits, as well as personal economic expectations, such as subjective job
security and earnings expectations. We re-elicit our respondents’ estimated likelihood of
a fall in real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2017 compared to the third quarter of 2017.
Moreover, we collect data on our respondents’ consumer and financial behavior in the
time between the main intervention and the follow-up. First, we ask our respondents
about their combined spending on food at home, food away from home, clothing and
leisure activities over the seven days before the follow-up.8 Second, we ask them whether
they bought any major durable goods and whether they actively increased or reduced
their stockholdings during the 14 days prior to the follow-up. Finally, we elicit our re-
spondents’ beliefs about their employers’ exposure to aggregate risk and about the most
likely causes of a potential recession, as well as their personal unemployment history.
2.4 Discussion of the experimental design
In our experiment we provide respondents with different individual professional fore-
casters’ assessments of the likelihood of a recession. An alternative experimental design
8 We chose to have a one-week time horizon as this mitigates concerns about measure-
ment error due to imperfect memory and as we were constrained by the time window
between the main survey and the follow-up. One caveat is that our measure includes
categories that are quite lumpy, such as clothing, and therefore may vary greatly across
individuals at the weekly frequency, which could lead to noisier estimates.
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would provide the average professional forecast to respondents in the treatment group,
while giving no information to individuals in a pure control group. We believe that our
design provides important advantages for studying the causal effect of recession expecta-
tions on personal economic expectations and behavior.
The variation in recession expectations in the alternative design would stem from
differences between individuals whose beliefs have been shifted, and those who still hold
their prior beliefs. Thus, the alternative design identifies the causal effect of recession
expectations on outcomes of individuals who hold unrealistic priors ex-ante, as the treat-
ment only shifts beliefs for this group. This could threaten the external validity of results
obtained under the alternative design. By contrast, our design also generates variation in
recession expectations among individuals with more realistic priors, and therefore identi-
fies average causal effects of recession expectations for a broader population. In addition,
receiving a forecast may not only shift the level of individuals’ beliefs but may also have
side-effects, such as reducing the uncertainty surrounding the level of their beliefs or
priming respondents on recessions and professional forecasts. In our design, the only
difference between the two treatment arms is the percent chance assigned to the event
of a recession by the professional forecast our respondents receive, while side-effects of
receiving a forecast should be common across treatment arms.9
There are two disadvantages of not having a pure control group. First, a pure control
group would allow us to assess whether the questions and procedures of the experiment
per se induce a change in subjects’ beliefs about a potential upcoming recession. While
this would give an indication of the external validity of our findings, we note that such
changes in expectations should be common across treatment arms and do not threaten
the internal validity of our results. Second, a pure control group would provide us with a
potentially more meaningful benchmark to interpret the magnitudes of the experimentally
estimated causal effects of subjects’ recession expectations on their macroeconomic and
9 Moreover, since in the alternative design the treatment intensity is correlated with the
level of the prior belief, heterogeneous effects across groups would conflate differences
in priors and differential extrapolation from macroeconomic to personal expectations.
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personal expectations as well as their behavior.
Under which conditions will our experimental design generate variation in respon-
dents’ recession expectations? As further discussed in online Appendix D.2 we require
i) that respondents do not fully “de-bias” the signals and thereby perfectly learn about
the average professional forecast and ii) that respondents believe that the professional
forecasts provide a relevant signal about the future state of the economy that is not yet
fully incorporated into their information sets.
2.5 Data
Representativeness Table A2 in the online Appendix provides summary statistics for
our sample. Around 80 percent of our respondents indicate that they are the main earner
in their household. Moreover, Table A3 displays the distributions of a range of individual
characteristics among respondents in full-time employment in the 2015 American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) and in our data. Our sample matches the distributions of gender,
age, region and total household income very precisely. In addition, the composition of
our sample is quite close to the composition of the population in full-time employment
along non-targeted dimensions, such as industry and hours worked. One caveat is that
our sample has higher labor earnings and is more educated than the US population in
full-time employment, similar to the New York Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations.
We address this issue by conducting heterogeneity analyses according to education and
by demonstrating the robustness of our results to re-weighting (Section 5).
Definition of variables First, we generate a variable measuring the perceive chance of
becoming personally unemployed over the next 12 months as the product of people’s per-
ceived probability of losing their main job within the next 12 months and their perceived
probability of not finding a new job within the following three months. For each respon-
dent we calculate the mean and standard deviation of expected inflation and expected
earnings growth using the mid-points of the bins to which the respondent has assigned
probabilities.10 Moreover, we create an index of people’s planned change in non-durable
10 We elicit probabilities over eight closed bins between -12 percent and 12 percent and
two open bins to which we assign -14 percent and 14 percent.
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consumption from the four weeks prior to the main survey to the four weeks after the
survey, using their qualitative spending plans for food at home, food away from home,
and leisure activities. Finally, we create a measure of people’s actual changes in spending
on food at home, food away from home, clothing and leisure based on their self-reported
spending during the seven days before the main survey and the seven days before the
follow-up survey.11 The questions on expected firm profits, the expected financial situa-
tion of the household and the change in stockholdings between main survey and follow-up
were elicited on five- and seven-point scales. We code these variables such that higher
values refer to “increase” or “improve” and lower values refer to “decrease” or “worsen”.
These qualitative outcome variables are normalized using the mean and standard de-
viation separately for the main survey and the follow-up survey. For the quantitative
measures we do not normalize outcome variables as they have a natural interpretation.
Integrity of the randomization Our sample is well-balanced for a set of key char-
acteristics and pre-treatment beliefs about the likelihood of a recession (Table A5). The
means do not differ significantly across treatment arms for any of these variables and
we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that the partial correlations of the variables with a
dummy for being in the high recession treatment are jointly zero. Moreover, we observe
no differential attrition in our main survey across treatment arms, and participation in
the follow-up survey is not related to treatment status in the main experiment. The
sample of individuals in the follow-up is balanced across the two treatment arms in terms
of key covariates (Table A6). There are marginally significantly more individuals with a
college degree and more men in the low recession treatment arm in the follow-up sample,
but we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that the correlations of the covariates with the
high recession dummy are jointly zero. To rule out any concerns, we include a set of
11 We take the difference in log spending from the follow-up and the baseline survey,
so this variable measures the percent change in spending. We deal with outliers by
setting spending growth to missing for respondents in the top and bottom two percent
of observed spending growth. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we instead use
one or five percent as cutoff, or if we winsorize the variable.
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control variables in all of our estimations.
Data quality We provide evidence that our expectations data on earnings and inflation
are of high quality by comparing our data with a panel survey by the New York Fed that
was launched as a predecessor to the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) (Armantier
et al., 2013). For example, for inflation expectations, 80 percent of our respondents
assign positive probability to more than one bin (89.4 percent in the Fed survey) and the
average number of bins with positive probability is 4.24 (3.83). Although a larger share
of our respondents assign positive probability to non-contiguous bins (6.9 percent vs 0.9
percent), this still accounts for a very small fraction of our sample. Only 0.4 percent,
6.5 percent and 0.3 percent of our respondents enter a prior probability of a fall in real
GDP of 0 percent, 50 percent and 100 percent, respectively, which may indicate mental
overload (de Bruin et al., 2000; Manski, 2017).
3 Updating of recession expectations
3.1 Prior beliefs
Stylized facts Respondents in our sample have a much more pessimistic macroeco-
nomic outlook than experts (Figures 1 and A.4 and Table A4). The median professional
forecaster in the second quarter of 2017 reports a likelihood of a recession in the fourth
quarter of 2017 of just 15 percent. By contrast, our median respondent assigns a proba-
bility of 40 percent, as pessimistic as professional forecasters were for the last time in the
second quarter of 2009. While there is a large dispersion in beliefs about the likelihood of
a recession among consumers, the dispersion of beliefs is much smaller in the sample of
professional forecasters, ranging from four professional forecasters estimating a 5 percent
chance of a recession to one forecaster assigning a 35 percent chance.
We confirm these patterns using robustness experiment 1 (described in more detail
in Table A1), which was conducted with an online convenience sample from the online
labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which is widely used in experimental
economics research (Cavallo et al., 2017; D’Acunto, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Roth et
al., 2019). We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of MTurk samples in appendix
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Section C.1. The median professional forecaster in the second quarter of 2018 reports
a likelihood of a recession in the fourth quarter of 2018 of 10 percent, while the me-
dian respondent in our MTurk sample assigns a probability of 45 percent (Figure A.8).
The distribution of recession expectations in the MTurk sample is remarkably robust
to incentivizing the consumers’ forecast using a quadratic scoring rule (see A.9).12 A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the distributions of incentivized and unincen-
tivized beliefs are not statistically distinguishable (p=0.319).
The finding of greater pessimism and a higher dispersion of beliefs among consumers
than among professional forecasters is in line with previous findings on inflation expec-
tations (Armantier et al., 2013; Mankiw et al., 2003) and with qualitative expectations
on aggregate economic conditions over a longer time period from the Michigan Survey of
Consumers (Das et al., 2018).13
Correlates of recession expectations Neither education nor age are related to peo-
ple’s recession expectations, but females have a significantly more pessimistic macroeco-
nomic outlook than men (Table A7). Interestingly, Democrats are much more pessimistic
compared to Independents, while Republicans are much more optimistic, consistent with
evidence on partisan bias in economic expectations (Mian et al., 2018). People who
have been personally unemployed in the past are significantly more pessimistic about
aggregate economic conditions, in line with Kuchler and Zafar (2018), who find that
individuals who lose their jobs become significantly less optimistic about the aggregate
economy. Taken together, it is reassuring that the correlations between covariates and
recession expectations are in line with previous literature.
3.2 Updating of recession expectations
Do our respondents update their recession expectations upon receiving the professional
forecasts? Figure 1 shows our first main result:
12 Respondents in the incentive condition are told that they can earn up to $1 depending
on the accuracy of their forecast.
13 In section E.1 in the online Appendix we confirm the external validity of these findings
using data from the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations.
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Result 1. The information provision strongly shifts expectations towards the professional
forecast in both treatment arms, and cross-sectional disagreement within the treatment
arms declines. This implies that the respondents were initially not fully informed about
the forecasts and that the forecasts are relevant to the respondents’ economic outlook.
Figure A.5 displays scatter plots of prior and posterior beliefs. Observations along the
horizontal lines indicate full updating of beliefs towards the professional forecast, while
respondents along the 45 degree line do not update at all. We observe more updating
of beliefs among respondents in the low recession treatment, where the average absolute
distance of prior beliefs to the signal of 5 percent is greater than in the high recession
treatment, which provides a forecast of 35 percent. 11.5 percent of respondents in the
low recession treatment and 19.5 percent of respondents in the high recession treatment
do not update their beliefs at all, while 68.6 percent (47.8 percent) of respondents either
fully or partially update their beliefs towards the signal (see Table A24). The remaining
respondents either “over-extrapolate” from the signal or update in the opposite direction.
However, part of these observed changes in beliefs could be caused by typos or by re-
spondents changing their beliefs because taking a survey on macroeconomic topics makes
them think more carefully about the question. Finally, the cross-sectional disagreement
in posterior beliefs as measured through the interquartile range and standard deviation
declines within both treatment arms compared to prior beliefs (Table A4).
Magnitudes We quantify the degree of updating of recession expectations by estimat-
ing a Bayesian learning rule that we derive in online Appendix D.1. We define updatingi
as the difference in people’s posterior and prior expectations, and the “shock” as the dif-
ference between the professional forecast and the prior belief, i.e. (35 - priori) for people
in the “high recession treatment” and (5 - priori) for people in the “low recession treat-
ment”. We assume that people’s prior beliefs about the probability of a recession follow
a beta distribution and that the loss function is quadratic. Under these assumptions,
people should follow a linear learning rule, updatingi = α1shocki, where α1 lies in the
interval [0, 1] and depends negatively on the strength of the respondent’s prior belief.
The individual-level shock depends on the respondent’s prior, which introduces two
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problems: First, the prior is measured with error, thereby leading to attenuation bias in
the estimated learning rate α1. Second, self-reported expectations could differ between
the prior and the posterior for reasons that are unrelated to the treatment but potentially
correlated with the prior. Most importantly, people who hold higher priors and are subject
to a more negative shock, should mechanically display more negative changes in their
expectations since the probability of a recession is bounded to be in the interval [0, 100],
leading to an upward bias in the estimate of α1. Controlling linearly for people’s prior
belief removes attenuation bias and mechanical correlations between people’s updating
and the shock, while not changing the interpretation of the estimated coefficient α1 as
the learning rate. Moreover, we include a vector of additional control variables Xi, which
increases our power to precisely estimate treatment effects and which allows us to control
for the slight imbalance in the follow-up sample.14 Specifically, we estimate the following
equation using OLS:
updatingi = α0 + α1shocki + α2priori + Π
TXi + εi (1)
where εi is an idiosyncratic error. We report robust standard errors throughout the paper.
We estimate a highly significant learning rate equal to about one third of the shock to
individual beliefs (Table 1). Our estimated learning rate from professional forecasts is in
the range of estimates in related literature (Armantier et al., 2016; Coibion et al., 2018a;
Fuster et al., 2018). Thus, our information treatment generates a difference of about 10
percentage points in people’s average posterior beliefs across treatment arms. The size
and significance of the estimated learning rate implies that the respondents found that
the forecasts contain some relevant information that was not already incorporated into
their priors. Online Appendix D.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the estimated
learning rate in the context of different corner cases and estimates in related literature.
14 The controls are as follows: age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a
dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s
Census region of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as
a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats.
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Are changes in expectations consistent with Bayesian updating? First, Bayesian
updating predicts that respondents should adjust their expectations partially or fully to-
wards new signals that they find informative, i.e. that learning rates should lie in the
interval [0, 1]. Our estimated learning rate of one third is in line with this prediction.
Second, Bayesian updating implies that respondents who are less confident in their prior
belief should react more strongly to new signals. We examine this prediction by con-
structing a dummy indicating whether the respondent is at least “sure” about his or her
prior estimate. Consistent with Bayesian updating, the estimated learning rate is signifi-
cantly lower for respondents who are more confident in their prior belief (Table 1 column
2). Moreover, respondents who report that they usually do not follow news on the na-
tional economy place significantly higher weight on the signal (column 3), consistent with
the idea that information acquisition prior to the experiment increases the strength of
people’s prior belief.15 In robustness experiment 3 described later we also find support
of two more predictions of Bayesian updating: i) receiving a forecast makes respondents
more confident in their beliefs; ii) changes in confidence are positively related to the
individual-level learning rate (Table A19).
Heterogeneous updating across demographic groups Individuals with lower ed-
ucation update more strongly from the forecasts, while there are no significant differences
according to income, gender, industry, personal unemployment experiences, the unem-
ployment rate in the county of residence and financial literacy (Table A10). Heterogeneity
15 We examine whether individuals put differential weight on signals that are more opti-
mistic or more pessimistic than their prior belief. We interact the individual-specific
shock with a dummy variable taking value one if shock < 0, and zero otherwise.
There is no asymmetric updating from relatively positive and relatively negative sig-
nals. Similarly, the weight put on the prior does not differ systematically between the
two treatment arms (p=0.443), indicating that our respondents do not differentially
weigh signals that are more or less positive in absolute terms. Finally, we find no sig-
nificant differences in learning rates according to the prior. Results are available upon
request.
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in learning rates could stem from differences in trust towards experts, differential ex-ante
informedness about the professional forecasts across groups,16 or different learning rules.
One way in which learning rules could differ across individuals is that less sophisticated
individuals could find it more difficult to rationally learn from the information. As shown
in Table A11, the heterogeneity in learning rates according to confidence in the prior is
fully driven by individuals with a college degree, while those without a college degree weigh
the new information independently of their confidence in their priors. The coefficients
on the interaction terms between the shock and confidence in the prior are significantly
different between the two groups (p < 0.01). Thus, while learning from information is
consistent with Bayesian updating for more sophisticated individuals, less sophisticated
individuals seem to follow simpler learning rules. Similarly, heterogeneity in learning
rates by news consumption is fully driven by highly educated respondents.
Do changes in recession expectations persist? Following Cavallo et al. (2017) we
employ a two-week follow-up survey in which no treatment information is administered.
The medium-run learning rate (calculated using the follow-up) amounts to about 40 per-
cent of the short-run learning rate (Table 1 column 5), in line with respondents receiving
new relevant signals about the macroeconomy between the two surveys or imperfect
memory (see also Figures 1 and A.6). Moreover, learning rates still differ significantly by
confidence in the prior and news consumption prior to the main survey.
Implications for macroeconomic models Our results presented in this section have
several implications for macroeconomic models. The finding that respondents use the
professional forecasts to persistently update their beliefs implies i) that the professional
forecasts were not fully incorporated into our respondents’ information sets before the sur-
vey and ii) that our respondents consider the information relevant for their expectations
about the future. This finding suggests that there exist costs of information acquisition,
16 According to theories of rational inattention, individuals with greater exposure to
macroeconomic risk and individuals with lower cost of acquiring information should
hold stronger prior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession. We cannot disentangle
these two forces in our data.
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as in micro-founded sticky information models (Reis, 2006).17 Our experiment sets these
costs to zero for a particular piece of news about aggregate economic growth.
Conditional on acquiring information, we observe heterogeneity in learning rates across
groups. This is in line with the idea that our respondents perceive the piece of information
with individual-specific noise, as in models of noisy information (Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt, 2015; Sims, 2003). In addition, we also observe heterogeneity in learning rules : On
the one hand, highly educated respondents put lower weight on the information when
they hold stronger priors, in line with the predictions of Bayesian updating. Rational
learning from new information is a key feature of both sticky and noisy information mod-
els, so these models may be able to proxy the expectation formation of more sophisticated
individuals in a reasonable manner. On the other hand, less highly educated respondents’
learning from the information does not seem to be well captured by Bayesian updating,
highlighting a role for cognitive limitations and heterogeneity in belief formation mecha-
nisms in macroeconomic models. These findings are consistent with recent evidence that
individuals with cognitive limitations display larger biases in their expectation formation
(D’Acunto et al., 2019a,b,c). Our findings are inconsistent with more traditional models
of full-information rational expectations (Muth, 1961) or models with no heterogeneity.18
Finally, in line with the model and time series evidence in Carroll (2003), our findings
imply that households exhibit some trust towards experts in the context of expectations
17 Our evidence on information acquisition costs in the context of expected economic
growth complements findings from experimental studies of households’ expectations
about inflation (Armantier et al., 2016; Cavallo et al., 2017) and house prices (Armona
et al., 2018; Fuster et al., 2018) or firm expectations (Coibion et al., 2018a).
18 Our findings suggest that in a setting where individuals observe one specific piece of
information once, more highly-educated respondents’ learning from information may
be well approximated by Bayesian updating. However, in general, salience could also
matter for how much weight individuals put on information. For instance, D’Acunto
et al. (2018b) document that the price changes of more frequently purchased goods
matter more for the formation of inflation and interest rate expectations.
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about general economic conditions.
4 The causal effect of recession expectations
4.1 Empirical specification
In the previous section we established that our respondents durably update their be-
liefs about the likelihood of a recession in response to professional forecasts. This provides
us with a first stage to examine the causal effect of recession expectations on expectations
about personal economic outcomes. Specifically, we examine whether people’s subjective
economic model, as measured through the size and heterogeneity of extrapolation to ex-
pectations about their personal situation, is in line with empirical facts. As a first step,
we examine how these expectations, expi, are correlated with our respondents’ posterior
beliefs about the likelihood of a recession, posteriori:
expi = β0 + β1posteriori + Π
TXi + εi (2)
where Xi is a vector of the same control variables that we included in our previous estima-
tions. The OLS estimate of β1 cannot be given a causal interpretation. For example, it is
possible that people who are generally more optimistic or pessimistic respond differently
to both the question on the posterior as well as the questions related to the evolution of
other economic outcomes. It is also conceivable that the direction of causality runs from
the personal situation to macroeconomic expectations, as suggested by recent evidence
in Kuchler and Zafar (2018). Finally, the estimate of β1 could be biased towards zero
because of measurement error in the posterior belief. To deal with omitted variable bias,
reverse causality and measurement error, we instrument our respondents’ posterior beliefs
with the random assignment to the different professional forecasts, where highrecessioni
is an indicator taking value one for individuals who received the pessimistic professional
forecast, and value zero for respondents receiving the optimistic forecast. Specifically, we
use two-stage least squares and estimate the following equation:
expi = β0 + β1 ̂posteriori + ΠTXi + εi (3)
21
where
̂posteriori = αˆ0 + αˆ1highrecessioni + Θˆ
T
Xi
We have a strong and highly significant first-stage on people’s post-treatment beliefs
about the likelihood of a recession based on the random assignment of the different
professional forecasts (F-Stat = 75.16; see Table 2).
4.2 Do recession expectations affect personal expectations?
Consistent with the evidence on updating of recession expectations, the experimental vari-
ation successfully shifts the respondents’ expectations about aggregate unemployment.
Posterior beliefs about a recession significantly affect people’s subjective probability that
the national unemployment rate will increase. In the IV specification a one percentage
point higher likelihood of a recession causes a 0.895 (0.536) percentage point increase in
the perceived chance that national (county-level) unemployment will increase (Panel B
of Table 2; columns 1 and 3). We find similar effects using the categorical measure which
is immune to numerical anchoring (column 2). The results on national and county-level
unemployment expectations are significant and of similar size in OLS and IV estimations.
Do recession expectations affect people’s beliefs about their personal economic out-
comes? Table 2 shows our second main result:
Result 2. People extrapolate from their recession expectations to their own households’
financial prospects and to expectations about personal unemployment. The estimated effect
sizes are large, but still close to job transitions during the last recession.
People who think that a recession is more probable are also more likely to hold pessimistic
beliefs about their own household’s financial prospects and expect lower earnings growth
in their job. They also report lower levels of subjective job security. The estimated effects
in the IV specifications are very similar in size to the OLS estimates, but the effects on
expected earnings growth become statistically insignificant (Panel B). The effect size on
subjective job security is substantial, yet in line with job losses during the last recession:
a one percentage point increase in the likelihood of a recession leads to an increase in
subjective unemployment risk of 0.113 percent. To illustrate the magnitude of this effect,
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consider moving from a situation with zero risk of a recession to a situation in which a
recession will happen with certainty. 11.3 percent of our respondents would then need to
become unemployed for their expectations to be accurate on average. For comparison,
the job loss rate increased by 7 percentage points during the Great Recession 2007-09,
and most laid-off workers remained unemployed for several months (Farber, 2011). Thus,
although the magnitude of our estimated effect is relatively large, it is still close to the
increase in unemployment during the last recession.19
4.3 Heterogeneous extrapolation to personal expectations
Actual differences in risk exposure across groups Actual exposure to macroe-
conomic risk should affect the extent to which people extrapolate from news about the
macroeconomy to their personal expectations. Therefore, we examine changes in un-
employment rates over the Great Recession for different demographic groups using data
from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The unemployment rate increased much more strongly among individuals without a col-
lege degree and among males (Figure A.10), consistent with previous literature (Hoynes
et al., 2012). There were similar changes in unemployment rates for individuals aged 25
to 44 and those aged 45 to 55. Moreover, the increase in unemployment during the Great
Recession was concentrated among workers who were previously employed in “cyclical in-
dustries”such as manufacturing, construction and services, while industries such as health
and education were less affected (Takhtamanova and Sierminska, 2016). Therefore, we
expect respondents with lower education, male respondents and respondents working in
more cyclical industries to update their expectations regarding personal unemployment
more strongly in response to a change in their macroeconomic outlook.
Who extrapolates from macroeconomic to personal expectations? In order to
test whether extrapolation to expectations about personal economic outcomes is driven
by respondents who are more strongly exposed to macroeconomic risk, we interact the
19 Figure A.18 displays local polynomial regressions of people’s expectations about per-
sonal economic circumstances on their prior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession.
The correlations are all strong and go into the expected directions.
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posterior belief with dummies for several dimensions of heterogeneity, heti. Specifically,
we estimate the following IV specification:20
expi = β0 + β1 ̂posteriori + β2 ̂posteriori × heti + β3heti + ΠTXi + εi (4)
where
̂posteriori = γˆ0 + γˆ1highrecessioni + γˆ2highrecessioni × heti + γˆ3heti + Θˆ
T
Xi
̂posteriori × heti = δˆ0 + δˆ1highrecessioni + δˆ2highrecessioni × heti + δˆ3heti + Ξˆ
T
Xi
Our third main result is as follows:
Result 3. People extrapolate from their macroeconomic outlook to their expected chance
of personal unemployment. These effects are driven by those individuals most strongly
exposed to macroeconomic risk. Thus, updating of personal expectations is data-consistent
in terms of size and heterogeneity, indicating that households have an understanding of
their exposure to macroeconomic risk.
For example, the perceived chance of becoming unemployed responds strongly for people
with lower education, while there is no such effect for people with high education (Figure
2 and Table A12). We find qualitatively similar patterns if we instead examine hetero-
geneity according to the level of earnings. While these differences across groups are large
in terms of magnitudes, they are statistically insignificant, potentially due to low power.
We find no strong differential response across age groups or gender.
Moreover, the effects of an expected economic downturn on personal unemployment
expectations are driven by individuals working in“cyclical industries”, those with previous
unemployment experiences and those living in counties with higher unemployment (Figure
2 and Table A13).21 These differences are large in magnitude and statistically significant
20 The IV specifications account for differential first stage effects of the “high recession”
treatment on posterior recession expectations across groups, and are able to isolate
differential second stage effects of posterior beliefs on personal outcomes. Reduced form
specifications would conflate differential first and second stage effects across groups.
21 We classify health, education and “other industries” (mostly public administration) as
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for previous unemployment experiences (p < 0.1) and county-level unemployment (p <
0.1), and insignificant for industry of employment (p = 0.18). The effects are driven
by job loss expectations for individuals with a personal unemployment history, and by
conditional job finding expectations for those living in areas with high unemployment
(Table A13). This is in line with the idea that high county-level unemployment could make
it more difficult to find re-employment in case of job loss, while a personal unemployment
history could proxy for being “marginal”. Overall, the effects on personal unemployment
expectations are driven by those with larger exposure to macroeconomic shocks.
Further, individuals with higher earnings, older individuals and men expect a reduced
earnings growth conditional on keeping their jobs as a result of an economic downturn
(Figure 2 and Table A14). The effects for these subgroups are significantly different from
zero and significantly larger than the effects on individuals with lower earnings (p < 0.05),
younger individuals (p < 0.1), and women (p < 0.05). These patterns are in line with
higher trend growth in earnings among men and individuals with higher earnings, as well
as downward rigidity in wages. Accordingly, an economic downturn could lead to lower,
but still non-negative earnings growth at the top of the distribution, while individuals
at the bottom of the distribution are affected through job loss, potentially because their
wages cannot fall, e.g. due to binding minimum wages.
Finally, there is no heterogeneity in the effect of beliefs about the likelihood of a re-
cession on the perceived chance that national unemployment will increase (Table A15).
Hence, while more exposed groups drive the results on extrapolation from recession ex-
pectations to their personal economic outlook, they expect changes in aggregate unem-
ployment similar to less exposed groups.
4.4 Do the effects persist over time?
Table A9 shows that most of our results on updating of expectations decrease in size,
but remain economically and statistically significant in the two-week follow-up survey.
non-cyclical industries, while construction, manufacturing, services, retail and whole-
sale, transportation and finance are classified as cyclical industries, in line with empir-
ical evidence (Guvenen et al., 2017; Takhtamanova and Sierminska, 2016).
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The table shows reduced-form estimates obtained from regressing the different outcome
variables on an indicator for the “high recession”-treatment and controls.22 People who
receive more pessimistic forecasts about the likelihood of a recession still report a sig-
nificantly higher probability of an increase in unemployment. For expectations about
national- and county-level unemployment, the effect sizes in the follow-up are about 50
percent and about 42 percent of the original effect sizes in the main study, respectively.
The treatment effects for all personal outcomes are not statistically distinguishable from
the treatment effects in the main experiment. However, the coefficients are less precisely
estimated in the follow-up and are about 50 percent (financial prospects) and about 25
percent (personal unemployment expectations) smaller than in the main study.
This reflects a substantial degree of persistence, given that our intervention was mild
and that people likely received other relevant signals about macroeconomic conditions and
their personal situation between the two surveys. Indeed, 65 percent of our respondents
agree that they followed news about the economy in the time between the main survey
and the follow-up survey.23 An alternative explanation for the reduced effect sizes is that
survey respondents could forget about the forecasts and revert back to a default level
of their expectations. In addition, we are naturally less powered to detect significant
treatment effects in the smaller sample of respondents who completed the follow-up.
Taken together, the persistence of the treatment effects suggests that our information
treatment leads to true belief updating, while concerns about numerical anchoring, short-
lived emotional responses to the treatment, or experimenter demand are mitigated.
22 We present reduced form results rather than instrumental variable estimates as the
first-stage for an IV regression where we instrument posterior beliefs with random treat-
ment assignment would suffer from weak instrument problems in the smaller follow-up
sample, i.e. the first-stage F-stat is 6.37, below 10.
23 If all respondents received the same perfectly informative signal between the main
survey and the follow-up, they would put a weight of 100 percent on the new signal,
leading to identical follow-up beliefs in the two treatment arms.
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4.5 Do macroeconomic expectations affect behavior?
According to a standard Euler equation, an innovation to expected future economic
resources should induce households to immediately adjust their consumption. Recent
evidence indicates that earnings reductions during recessions are large (Farber, 2011),
that recessions can accelerate pre-existing adverse trends in the labor market situation of
subgroups (Charles et al., 2016; Hershbein and Kahn, 2016), and that recessions can have
scarring effects that induce workers to permanently drop out of the labor force (Yagan,
2018). Combined, these findings suggest that economic downturns can entail substantial
shocks to people’s permanent income. Therefore, we expect individuals to revise their
consumption plans when they change their expectations regarding a recession.
In this section, we examine whether updating of recession expectations leads people
to adjust their behavior. First, we examine whether updating of recession expectations
affects our measures of planned and actual changes in non-durable spending around the
main intervention. We focus on non-durables, as for this category, consumption plausibly
equals expenditure. Second, we examine whether updating of recession expectations
leads our respondents to report a more negative climate for durables purchases or to
postpone the actual adjustment in their stock of durables (Bertola et al., 2005). Third,
we analyze whether updating of recession expectations leads households to actively adjust
their stockholdings. Given the well-documented inertia in household portfolios (Bilias et
al., 2010; Calvet et al., 2009), the reaction of stock purchases should be small.
We estimate the same IV specification 3 as for our previous analysis, except that our
independent variable is now the difference between posterior and prior beliefs about the
likelihood of a recession, as our outcome variables refer to changes in individual behavior
instead of levels of expectations. In addition we control for people’s prior belief. Table 3
shows our fourth main result:
Result 4. People’s macroeconomic outlook causally affects their consumption plans and
stock purchases.
Specifically, becoming more pessimistic about the aggregate economy has a significantly
negative effect on our respondents’ consumption plans for non-durable goods (column
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1). A 10 percentage point increase in the perceived likelihood of a recession leads to a
decrease in planned consumption growth by 13 percent of a standard deviation. This is
in line with the effect size of 11 percent of a standard deviation on the expected change
in the financial situation of the household in Table 2 column 4. While there seem to be
increases in actual consumption growth, these effects are noisily measured and statistically
insignificant (column 2). This noisy measurement could arise from i) the fact that our
measure includes some categories that are quite lumpy and at the weekly frequency vary
a lot across individuals (such as clothing), ii) imperfect memory about actual spending
and iii) the smaller sample size in the follow-up compared to the main survey. We find no
evidence that macroeconomic expectations affect people’s assessment of the consumption
climate for durable goods (column 3), or their actual durables purchases (column 4).
Moreover, increased pessimism about the economy strongly affects people’s self-reported
net purchases of stocks between the main survey and the follow-up (column 5). The large
reaction despite inertia in household portfolios may be due to the fact that respondents
in both treatment arms were extremely pessimistic before the treatment, and thus the
information provision implied a shift towards a lower subjective probability of a recession
that was strong enough to trigger adjustments in portfolios. Consistent with this expla-
nation, the effect is fully driven by higher net purchases of stocks in the treatment arm
that received the more optimistic forecast, while there is no significant difference for net
sales of stocks (columns 6 and 7).24 A 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a
recession reduces the likelihood of purchasing stocks by 5 percentage points.
Thus, a higher expected probability of a recession reduces planned consumption
growth and should, for a given income, increase saving. Higher saving and lower net
purchases of stocks should be reflected in a reduction of the risky portfolio share.25 Sur-
24 Only 12 individuals in our sample report net sales of stocks, while 54 individuals
(41 individuals) in the more optimistic (pessimistic) treatment report net purchases
of stocks. This corresponds to a 36 percent higher fraction of respondents with net
purchases in the “low recession treatment” compared to the “high recession treatment”.
25 Given that our variables on consumption plans and stock purchases are categorical,
this is not guaranteed and depends on the fractions of people changing their behavior
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vey measures of consumers’ expected stock returns behave procyclically and co-move with
expectations about general economic conditions, even though this is at odds with theory,
market measures of expected returns, and the actual equity premium in the US (Amromin
and Sharpe, 2013; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). Moreover, consumers’ subjective risk
surrounding future returns behaves countercyclically. This suggests that higher and less
uncertain expected returns could be driving our results. Alternatively, a higher per-
ceived probability of a recession could increase perceived consumption risk or reduce the
expected level of consumption, both of which lead to a lower risky portfolio share in
standard portfolio choice problems with CRRA utility.
4.6 Expectations and news consumption
An increase in macroeconomic risk should lead rationally (in-)attentive economic
agents to allocate more of their attention to macroeconomic news (Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt, 2015; Sims, 2003). However, we find no evidence that expectations about the like-
lihood of a recession causally affect people’s consumption of news about the general
economy as measured in the follow-up survey (Table A22).26
We also study whether updating of recession expectations between the main survey
and the follow-up survey is affected by people’s consumption of news between the sur-
veys. Columns (2) and (3) shows that news consumption between the two surveys is
uncorrelated with people’s updating defined as the difference between the posterior belief
in the follow-up and the prior belief in the main survey.
4.7 Subjective beliefs about the macroeconomy
Our design also allows us to shed light on how expectations about different macroeco-
nomic variables are causally related. Many macroeconomic models incorporate a Phillips
Curve, a negative relationship between unemployment and inflation. An implicit assump-
tion in most models is that agents form their expectations according to the true model.
and the conditional amounts by which people adjust.
26 We find no significant heterogeneity in treatment effects on respondents’ news con-
sumption by proxies for people’s exposure to macroeconomic risk or proxies for people’s
information acquisition costs. Results are available upon request.
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Moreover, there was substantial disinflation during most recessions in the past (Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2015b). Thus, a higher likelihood of a recession could lower people’s
inflation expectations. Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2 show our fifth main result:
Result 5. There is no significantly negative causal effect of people’s expectations about
the likelihood of a recession on their inflation expectations.
While mean expected inflation is positively correlated with people’s recession expectations
(Panel A column 8), this relationship is statistically insignificant in IV specification (Panel
B). In the IV specification we can reject effects below -0.015 at a significance level of 10
percent. Recession expectations are positively correlated with inflation uncertainty, but
again this effect vanishes in the IV specification (column 9). These results mirror the
findings by Coibion et al. (2018a) who show that firms do not update their expectations
about GDP growth and unemployment when their inflation expectations are shocked.
There are several potential explanations for why we do not find a negative effect
of recession expectations on expected inflation. First, the reference time horizon of 12
months for our expectations questions may be too short. Second, our respondents could
think that a potential recession is caused by a negative technology shock or a cost-push
shock, both of which entail a negative co-movement of the output gap and inflation in
standard New-Keynesian models. In our data on beliefs about likely causes of a recession,
collected in the follow-up, a decline in consumer confidence and political turmoil are the
most frequently mentioned causes, while supply-side factors, such as an oil price increase,
are not mentioned as frequently (Figure A.11).27 Third, consumers may not be sufficiently
sophisticated to account for complex relations between macroeconomic variables in their
belief formation. Indeed, the high standard errors of our estimates suggest that there is
a lot of disagreement among respondents on how a recession will affect inflation.
Finally, recession expectations causally affect our respondents’ expectations regarding
firm profits (column 10). A 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a recession
leads to a decrease in expected firm profits by 13 percent of a standard deviation. The
27 We find no heterogeneous responses of inflation expectations dependent on whether
respondents think that the recession will be caused by supply- or demand-side factors.
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fact that our respondents expect part of an economic downturn to be absorbed by firm
profits is in line with recent empirical evidence that firms partially insure their workers
against negative shocks (Fagereng et al., 2017a,b). In appendix Section E.2 we provide
additional results on our respondents’ subjective beliefs about insurance within the firm.
5 Robustness
Experimenter demand effects Treatment effects in experiments that shift respon-
dents’ expectations could be biased as a result of experimenter demand effects. Specifi-
cally, respondents in the different treatment groups may form different beliefs about the
experimenter’s expectations and try to conform with these expectations.28 We provide
several pieces of evidence against the relevance of experimenter demand effects.
First, we assess the sensitivity of our respondents’ economic expectations to “demand
treatments” (de Quidt et al., 2018), through which we try to deliberately shift our re-
spondents’ beliefs about the experimenters’ hypothesis about the participants’ responses.
We conducted an additional experiment on MTurk (robustness experiment 2, described
in more detail in Table A1) in which a random subset of our respondents is assigned to
receive a “demand treatment”, while a control group does not receive any information or
signal. Neither of the two groups is shown a professional forecast. In the demand treat-
ment respondents are provided with the following message: “In this experiment people are
randomly assigned to receive different instructions. We hypothesize that participants who
are shown the same instructions as you report more optimistic expectations about the US
economy.” Afterwards we elicit all respondents’ recession expectations, their qualitative
household financial prospects and their consumption plans. The demand treatment has
very small and insignificant effects on the outcome measures (Table A21). This suggests
that respondents’ self-reported expectations in a setting close to ours are not responsive
to explicit signals about the experimental hypothesis.
Second, the patterns of heterogeneity in extrapolation from macroeconomic to per-
sonal expectations that we documented in Section 4.3 imply that our findings could only
28 Evidence suggests that respondents in online surveys respond only very moderately to
explicit signals about the experimenter’s wishes (de Quidt et al., 2018).
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be explained by experimenter demand effects that are systematically related to people’s
actual exposure to aggregate risk. In addition, the heterogeneity in updating of recession
expectations in response to the professional forecasts documented in Section 3.2 (e.g. by
people’s confidence in their prior) is also only consistent with differential experimenter
demand effects across these groups, which we find unlikely.
Third, within-designs may induce stronger experimenter demand effects than between-
designs. In our main experiment we elicit priors only for recession expectations, while we
rely on a between-design for all other outcomes. In robustness experiment 3 (described
in more detail in Table A1) we also examine whether updating of recession expectations
depends on whether a within-design or a between-design is employed. For this purpose we
cross-randomize whether people are asked about their prior belief on top of the random
assignment of the professional forecast predicting a 5 percent probability of a recession.
We find no significant difference in updating of recession expectations in response to a 5
percent forecast regardless of the design employed (Table A18 Column 5). This suggests
that it is unlikely that the within-design employed induces strong demand effects.
Fourth, in our initial experiment we displayed people’s prior belief using a red bar
and the professional forecast using a yellow bar. In robustness experiment 3, we instead
display people’s prior with a blue bar, and the professional forecast with a yellow bar,
which potentially helps to avoid giving respondents the impression that their priors are
the “wrong” beliefs (Bazley et al., 2018). Our estimated learning rates from professional
forecasts of 5 percent and 30 percent from robustness experiment 3 are remarkably close
to our estimates from the main experiment (Table A18 column 3). This suggests that
our findings are robust to the exact graphical illustration of the treatment information.
Finally, in robustness experiment 3 we also modified our experimental instructions
to provide an even briefer explanation of economic concepts to our respondents in the
beginning of the survey. Next to the quantitative similarity in learning rates from the
forecasts, the estimated causal effects of recession expectations on expectations about
national unemployment and firm profits in IV estimations remain highly significant (Table
A20). Taken together, despite the changes in the experimental instructions, different
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colors of bars, the different survey populations and the different times, we find very
similar effects of our intervention on respondents’ expectations.
Numerical anchoring An additional methodological concern for our quantitative out-
come measures, such as posterior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession, is unconscious
numerical anchoring. We alleviate concerns about numerical anchoring in several ways.
First, we follow the approach of providing irrelevant numerical anchors suggested by
Coibion et al. (2018c) and Cavallo et al. (2017). In robustness experiment 3, we ran-
domly assign our respondents to receiving (i) a professional forecast predicting a 5 percent
probability of a recession, (ii) an irrelevant numerical anchor stating that “according to
official statistics, 5 % of the total U.S. population in 1970 were legal immigrants”, or (iii)
no information. While provision of the professional forecast strongly shifts respondents’
expectations, the effect of the irrelevant numerical anchor is a precisely estimated zero
and the difference in learning rates is significant at the 1 percent level (Table A18). In
robustness experiment 2 we show that the provision of a different irrelevant numerical
anchor does not significantly shift respondents’ recession expectations, their household
financial prospects or their consumption plans (Table A21).29
Second, our treatment has significant and strong effects on categorical measures of
expectations about national unemployment, firm profits and the household’s financial
situation, all of which are naturally immune to numerical anchoring. This suggests that
changes in quantitative measures of expectations are not driven by numerical anchoring.
Finally, as documented in Section 4.4, changes in beliefs remain economically and
statistically significant in the two-week follow-up. Since numerical anchoring is a very
short-lived phenomenon by definition, this provides additional evidence against the pos-
sibility that our treatment effects are driven by numerical anchoring.
External validity Our sample is representative of the full-time employed US popula-
tion in terms of age, gender, region and income, but not in terms of education. In order
29 We tell our respondents “We would like to provide you with some information about
the share of illegal immigrants in the United States. According to the Department of
Homeland Security, 3 percent of the total U.S. population are illegal immigrants.”
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to check the external validity of our findings, we use the 2015 American Community
Survey to create weights that make our sample also representative in terms of education.
Specifically, we create weights based on the following 64 cells: gender (2) × aged above 42
(2) × above median income (2) × at least college degree (2) × region of residence (west,
south, northeast, midwest) (4). Reweighting has no appreciable effects on our main find-
ings (Table A23). In our main analysis we therefore focus on unweighted results, which
should be less sensitive to outliers.
6 Conclusion
We conduct an information experiment in which we provide respondents with differ-
ent professional forecasters’ assessment of the probability of a fall in real GDP. We use
the exogenous variation generated by the information treatment to examine the causal
effect of recession expectations on expectations about personal outcomes and behavior.
Respondents extrapolate to their perceived chance of becoming personally unemployed in
a data-consistent manner. The magnitude of the effect is consistent with job losses during
the last recession, and there is heterogeneity in line with proxies for actual exposure to
risk. Finally, we provide evidence that people’s expectations about the macroeconomy
causally affect their consumption plans and stock purchases.
Overall, our findings are consistent with macroeconomic models of imperfect informa-
tion (Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2015; Reis, 2006; Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003): first,
we find that consumers are initially uninformed about relevant signals about the macroe-
conomy. Second, respondents update their economic expectations in response to news
about the macroeconomic environment in line with the predictions of Bayesian updating,
although this is not the case for individuals with lower education. Third, updating of per-
sonal expectations is data-consistent in terms of size and heterogeneity, indicating that
our respondents have an understanding of their own exposure to macroeconomic risk.
At a practical level, our findings identify specific groups that policymakers can expect
to react to an improved macroeconomic outlook. Specifically, groups with the largest
exposure to aggregate risk, such as individuals working in cyclical industries, are most
likely to respond to an improved macroeconomic outlook, while a large fraction of the
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population is unlikely to react. Policymakers could maximize the effectiveness of their
communication strategies by targeting these groups.
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Posterior in follow-up: Treatment 35 %
Notes: This figure displays the distributions of prior and posterior beliefs in the two
treatment arms.
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Notes: This figure displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the likelihood of a recession on people’s (i)
subjective chance of being unemployed (Panel A) and (ii) expected mean earnings growth conditional on working at the
same job (Panel B) for different demographic groups, including 90-percent confidence bands. Individuals with above median
earnings ($54,800) are classified as having high earnings. Panel C displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs
about the likelihood of a recession on people’s subjective chance of being unemployed for groups with different exposure
to risk, including 90-percent confidence bands. Health, education and public administration are classified as non-cyclical
industries, while construction, manufacturing, services, retail and wholesale, transportation and finance are classified as
cyclical industries. “High county unemployment” indicates living in a county with an above median unemployment rate
(4.5 percent). The estimates are based on IV estimations, where the posterior likelihood of a recession is interacted with
the dimension of heterogeneity of interest. These results are also shown in Table A12 in the online Appendix.
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Table 1: Main results: Learning rates
Updating (Main Survey) Updating (Follow-up)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Shock 0.318∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.047) (0.076) (0.041) (0.050) (0.073) (0.117)




Shock × -0.150∗ -0.293∗∗
Follow news (0.085) (0.130)
Follow news 1.798 2.176
(2.740) (4.178)
Prior -0.247∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.450∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.057) (0.081) (0.048) (0.059) (0.093) (0.125)
Observations 1124 1124 1124 736 736 736 736
Sample Baseline Baseline Baseline Basel. (compl. Follow-up Follow-up Follow-up
follow-up)
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of the learning rate from the professional forecasts
based on specification 1. All specifications control for the respondent’s prior belief, age,
age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least
a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure
of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy for Republicans and a dummy
for Democrats. Specifications 2, 3, 6 and 7 also control for interactions of the prior with
the dimension of heterogeneity. The outcome in columns 1-4 is the difference between the
posterior belief measured in the main study and the prior belief. The outcome in columns
5-7 is the difference between the posterior measured in the follow-up study and the prior
belief. “Confident” takes value one for respondents saying that they are “very sure” or
“sure” about their estimate of the likelihood of a recession. “Follow news” takes value
zero if respondents somewhat or strongly disagree with the statement “I usually follow
news on the national economy” and value one otherwise. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: OLS
Posterior: Recession 0.528∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.001) (0.035) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Panel B: IV
Posterior: Recession 0.895∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.013 0.002 0.113∗ 0.014 0.006 -0.013∗∗
(0.131) (0.006) (0.118) (0.006) (0.020) (0.013) (0.066) (0.018) (0.015) (0.005)
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 1118 1118 1123 1121 1121 1124
Mean dep. var. 32.09 0.01 29.55 -0.01 2.64 1.79 6.61 2.60 2.74 -0.01
SD dep. var. 24.18 1.00 23.20 1.00 3.42 2.41 11.47 3.05 2.71 1.00
First stage F-stat 75.16 75.16 75.16 75.16 74.56 74.56 75.25 75.71 75.71 75.16
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates based on specification 2 (Panel A) and IV estimates based on specification 3 (Panel B) of the effect of
recession expectations on expectations about macroeconomic and personal outcomes. All specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy
for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a
measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats. The outcomes in columns 2, 4
and 10 are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation of our sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Updating: Recession -0.013∗∗ -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.014∗∗ -0.005∗∗ 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001)
Prior -0.013∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1124 706 1124 732 732 732 732
Mean dep. var. -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.02
SD dep. var. 1.00 0.73 1.00 0.34 0.99 0.34 0.13
First stage F-stat 85.76 79.20 85.76 73.45 73.45 73.45 73.45
Notes: The table shows IV estimates of the effect of updating of recession expectations on changes in people’s behavior. All
specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor
degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy
for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats. The outcomes in columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 are z-scored using the mean and standard
deviation in our sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1
pct. level.
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Online Appendix: How Do Expectations About the
Macroeconomy Affect Personal Expectations and Behavior?
Christopher Roth1 Johannes Wohlfart2
Summary of the online appendix
Section A provides additional figures. Section B provides additional tables. In sec-
tion B.1 we provide summary statistics, balance checks and descriptive evidence. Section
B.2 provides evidence on heterogeneous treatment effects. Section B.3 provides evidence
on the robustness of our findings, e.g. to numerical anchoring, experimenter demand
effects and the use of population weights to match the general population in terms of
income, education, region, age, and gender. Section B.4 shows additional results on peo-
ple’s macroeconomic expectations and their news consumption. Section C.1 describes
the MTurk sample used in our experiment and discusses advantages and disadvantages
of using MTurk as a subject pool. Section C.2 describes the imputation for the hetero-
geneity analysis. Section D.1 derives a Bayesian learning rule under the assumption of
beta distributed prior beliefs. Section D.2 provides some benchmarks for our estimated
learning rate based on different assumptions on people’s interpretation of the signal and
their trust in professional forecasts. Section E.1 provides evidence on the external validity
of our descriptive finding of pessimism among consumers relative to professional forecast-
ers using the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations. Section E.2 provides
additional descriptive evidence on people’s beliefs about insurance within the firm.
1 Christopher Roth, Institute on Behavior and Inequality (briq), Bonn,
e-mail: chris.roth@briq-institute.org
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Figure A.3: Information treatment: High recession group
Notes: Treatment screen for people in the “high recession treatment”. In this example
screen the prior belief about the likelihood of a recession was 33 percent.









0 10 20 30 40
Recession Forecasts: Survey of Professional Forecasters (2017 Q2)
Notes: This figure displays predictions on the likelihood of a fall in US real GDP in the
fourth quarter of 2017 compared to the preceding quarter among professional forecasters
in the SPF. Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters, wave 2017Q2.
































0 20 40 60 80 100
Prior Belief
Treatment: 35%
Notes: This figure displays scatter plots of prior and posterior beliefs in the two treatment
arms. The size of the circles corresponds to the mass of data points for any combination
of priors and posteriors. The dashed horizontal lines correspond to the signal provided
to the respondents in the “high recession” and “low recession” treatments respectively.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Prior Belief
Treatment: 35% (Follow-up)
Notes: This figure displays scatter plots of prior and posterior beliefs in the two treatment
arms in the two-week follow-up survey. The size of the circles corresponds to the mass
of data points for any combination of prior and posterior. The dashed horizontal lines
correspond to the signal provided to the respondents in the “high recession” and “low
recession” treatments respectively.
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Updating (follow-up): Treatment 35 %
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of belief updating in the two treatment arms
using posteriors from both the baseline survey and the follow-up survey.
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Figure A.8: Distribution of predictions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters from




















0 20 40 60 80 100
Recession Expectations: Professional Forecasters
Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of predictions about the likelihood of a fall
in US real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2018 compared to the preceding quarter among
300 MTurk participants collected in the summer of 2018 in robustness experiment 1. The
right panel displays predictions on the likelihood of a fall in US real GDP in the fourth
quarter of 2018 compared to the preceding quarter among professional forecasters in the
SPF. Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters, wave 2018Q2.
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Recession Expectations (No Incentives)
Notes: The figures show the distribution of predictions about the likelihood of a fall in
US real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2018 compared to the preceding quarter among 300
MTurk participants collected in the summer of 2018. The predictions shown in the left
figure were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule (respondents could earn up to $1),
while the predictions shown in the right figure were unincentivized.
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Notes: This figure displays the evolution of unemployment rates among (i) individuals
with a college degree and without a college degree aged 25-55 during the Great Recession;
(ii) individuals aged 25-44 and individuals aged 45-55 during the Great Recession (iii) men
and women aged 25-55 during the Great Recession. The numbers are seasonally adjusted
by partialling out the effect of month dummies. Source: Merged outgoing rotation files
of the Current Population Survey (CPS).




























































































Three most likely recession causes
Notes: This figure displays the beliefs about the likely causes of a recession, ranked from
most often mentioned to least often mentioned.
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Percent chance of an increase in county unemployment
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of expectations about the likelihood of an
increase in national unemployment (left panel) and county unemployment (right panel).





















































































































Percent chance of different inflation/deflation rates over the next 12 months
Notes: This figure displays the average probabilities assigned to different ranges of infla-
tion and deflation rates in the main survey.
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Heterogeneity in inflation uncertainty
Notes: This figure displays the distributions of means (left panel) and standard deviations
(right panel) of individual subjective probability distributions over future inflation in the
main survey.














































































































































Percent chance of different changes in earnings over the next 12 months
Notes: This figure displays the average probabilities assigned to different ranges of earn-
ings growth in the main survey.
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Heterogeneity in earnings uncertainty
Notes: This figure displays the distributions of means (left panel) and standard deviations
(right panel) of individual subjective probability distributions over future earnings growth
in the main survey.
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Percent chance of fnding a job within 3 months
Notes: This figure displays the distribution of people’s beliefs about the likelihood of
losing their job or finding a job within 3 months after a job loss.
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Prior Belief
Notes: This figure displays local polynomial regressions of people’s expectations about
personal economic outcomes on the prior belief about the likelihood of a recession.
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B Additional tables
Table A1: Overview of Experiments
Experiment Sample Treatments Arms




5 percent forecast (T5), 35 percent fore-
cast (T35)
Main Experiment: Follow-
up (June and July 2017)
Research Now
(N=737)






Incentivized vs. unincentivized elicita-






Irrelevant numerical anchor and “de-





5 percent forecast (T5), 30 percent fore-
cast (T30), Average of all forecasts
(T15), 5 percent forecast (T5 no prior),
Only prior but no forecast, No prior
and no forecast (Pure control), irrele-
vant numerical anchor
Notes: This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.
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B.1 Summary statistics, balance, and descriptives
Table A2: Summary statistics: Representative online panel
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Female 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1124
Age 42.61 12.56 42.00 19.00 76.00 1124
At least bachelor’s degree 0.71 0.45 1.00 0.00 1.00 1124
Household net income 99597.93 64962.47 87500.00 7500.00 250000.00 1113
Liquid assets 72164.44 92034.09 12500.00 250.00 250000.00 1049
Familiy size 2.57 1.34 2.00 1.00 11.00 1114
Single 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1122
Married 0.55 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1122
Separated 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1122
Divorced 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 1122
Widowed 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 1122
Midwest 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1124
West 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 1124
South 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1124
Northeast 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 1124
Individual gross earnings 69932.23 52518.79 54748.15 1012.61 506303.81 1124
Weekly hours worked 41.31 7.15 45.00 5.00 65.00 1120
Industry: Construction 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Nondurable manufacturing 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Durable manufacturing 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Transportation 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Retail and wholesale 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Finance 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Services 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Health and education 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Industry: Other 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 1088
Public employer 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1120
Private employer 0.59 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 1120
Other employer 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 1120
Tenure 8.71 7.67 7.50 0.50 25.00 1120
Democrat 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1114
Republican 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1114
Fin. literacy: Interest compounding - Correct 0.87 0.33 1.00 0.00 1.00 1117
Fin. literacy: Inflation - Correct 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.00 1.00 1117
Fin. literacy: Diversification - Correct 0.67 0.47 1.00 0.00 1.00 1117
Employer’s hiring depends on aggregate economy 4.17 1.50 4.00 1.00 7.00 732
Employer’s firing depends on aggregate economy 3.80 1.53 4.00 1.00 7.00 732
Employer’s profits depend on aggregate economy 4.47 1.52 5.00 1.00 7.00 732
Ever involuntarily unemployed 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 731
Prior belief: Recession 41.01 23.59 40.00 0.00 100.00 1124
Higher unemployment: Categorical 2.97 0.88 3.00 1.00 5.00 1124
Higher unemployment: Probability 32.09 24.18 25.00 0.00 100.00 1124
Higher unemployment (county): Probability 29.55 23.20 25.00 0.00 100.00 1124
Financial prospects: Categorical 4.35 1.14 4.00 1.00 7.00 1124
Earnings expectations: Mean 2.64 3.42 2.23 -14.00 14.00 1118
Earnings expectations: Std. dev. 1.79 2.41 1.00 0.00 12.45 1118
Personal unemployment: Probability 6.61 11.47 1.77 0.00 100.00 1123
Job loss: Probability 13.33 20.15 5.00 0.00 100.00 1124
Job finding: Probability 53.62 31.76 53.00 0.00 100.00 1123
Inflation expectations: Mean 2.60 3.05 2.22 -14.00 14.00 1121
Inflation expectations: Std. dev. 2.74 2.71 1.79 0.00 14.00 1121
Higher profitability all firms: Categorical 3.38 0.76 3.00 1.00 5.00 1124
Non-durable spending last week 201.92 184.85 150.00 0.00 2000.00 1122
Non-durable spending growth (percent) 6.63 70.45 0.00 -200.00 200.00 733
Bought durable goods 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 732
Increased stockholdings 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 732
Decreased stockholdings 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 732
Notes: This table shows summary statistics using data from the main experiment and
the follow-up survey.
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Table A3: Comparison of the representative online panel with the 2015 American Com-
munity Survey










Household net income 97839 99597





Individual gross earnings 54871 69806
Weekly hours worked 42.65 41.31
Industry: Construction 0.06 0.027
Industry: Nondurable manufacturing 0.079 0.048
Industry: Durable manufacturing 0.072 0.067
Industry: Transportation 0.074 0.066
Industry: Retail and wholesale 0.185 0.076
Industry: Finance 0.068 0.089
Industry: Services 0.19 0.242
Industry: Health and education 0.208 0.257
Industry: Other 0.064 0.125
Employer: Public 0.165 0.317
Employer: Private 0.753 0.585
Employer: Other 0.084 0.096
Notes: This table compares the distributions of individual characteristics in our sample
and in the ACS. Our sample only contains individuals in full-time employment. The ACS
sample is restricted to individuals working at least 30 hours per week.
Table A4: Recession expectations in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the rep-
resentative online panel
Mean SD Median IQR Min. Max. Obs.
Probability: Recession (SPF) 14.01 7.65 15.00 13.00 0.00 35.00 31
Prior: Recession (online panel) 41.01 23.59 40.00 36.50 0.00 100.00 1124
Posterior: High Recession (online panel) 34.29 17.48 35.00 24.00 1.00 98.00 569
Posterior: Low Recession (online panel) 24.28 22.14 15.00 31.00 0.00 100.00 555
Notes: This table displays summary statistics of the perceived probability of an fall in
real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2017 relative to the third quarter among professional
forecasters in the SPF and among respondents in our representative online panel (prior
to the information treatment). The data from the SPF are from the wave conducted in
the second quarter of 2017. The data from the representative online panel were collected
in summer 2017.
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Table A5: Balance across the two treatment arms
Recession: High Recession: Low P-value(High - Low) Observations
Female 0.47 0.45 0.417 1124
Age 42.45 42.77 0.667 1124
At least bachelor’s degree 0.70 0.72 0.327 1124
Log(Income) 11.29 11.29 0.898 1113
Republican 0.37 0.36 0.811 1114
Democrat 0.40 0.39 0.695 1114
Midwest 0.24 0.22 0.444 1124
South 0.37 0.40 0.260 1124
West 0.22 0.19 0.203 1124
Prior belief: Recession 41.82 40.18 0.244 1124
Notes: The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing the treatment dummy on all covari-
ates is 0.7336.
Table A6: Balance across the two treatment arms in the follow-up sample
Recession: High Recession: Low P-value(High - Low) Observations
Female 0.46 0.40 0.097 736
Age 42.92 44.13 0.201 736
At least bachelor’s degree 0.70 0.76 0.086 736
Log(Income) 11.29 11.33 0.441 732
Republican 0.38 0.36 0.575 728
Democrat 0.40 0.39 0.831 728
Midwest 0.24 0.23 0.908 736
South 0.38 0.39 0.666 736
West 0.21 0.16 0.104 736
Prior belief: Recession 40.72 39.77 0.589 736
Notes: The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing the treatment dummy on all covari-
ates is 0.4391.
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Age squared -0.004∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.004)






Financial literacy -9.909∗∗∗ -2.404
(2.242) (2.400)
County unemployment 0.715 0.345
(0.554) (0.597)
Ever unemployed 2.003 2.980
(1.851) (1.906)
Confidence in prior -0.451 0.889
(0.752) (0.736)
Observations 1124 1124
Notes: Column 1 shows regression coefficients from separate univariate regression for the
different covariates. Column 2 shows regression coefficients from a multivariate regression.
* denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
Table A8: Belief updating
















Forecast 5 percent 72 64 303 78 38 555
Forecast 35 percent 78 111 201 71 108 569
Total 150 175 504 149 146 1,124
Notes: This table classifies the respondents in the two treatment arms according to their
updating behavior.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Main complete sample
Recession: High 10.203∗∗∗ 9.128∗∗∗ 5.467∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.127∗∗ 1.150∗
(1.169) (1.390) (1.344) (0.056) (0.058) (0.685)
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1123
Panel B: Main follow-up sample
Recession: High 10.861∗∗∗ 9.843∗∗∗ 6.670∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.116 1.465∗
(1.429) (1.670) (1.661) (0.069) (0.071) (0.883)
Observations 737 737 737 737 737 736
Panel C: Follow-up
Recession: High 3.992∗∗∗ 5.109∗∗∗ 2.699 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.062 0.948
(1.540) (1.835) (1.723) (0.069) (0.071) (1.036)
Observations 737 737 737 737 737 736
Notes: The table shows reduced form estimates of the effect of the random treatment
assignment on expectations about macroeconomic and personal outcomes. All specifi-
cations control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for
respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region
of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy for Re-
publicans and a dummy for Democrats. Outcomes in columns 4 and 5 are z-scored using
the mean and standard deviation in our sample for the main sample and the follow-up
separately. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct.,
** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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B.2 Heterogeneity
Table A10: Learning rates: Heterogeneity across groups
Updating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Shock (a) 0.431∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044) (0.081) (0.050) (0.098)
Shock × (b) -0.153∗∗
High education (0.075)
Shock × (b) -0.053
High earnings (0.068)
Shock × (b) -0.070
Age>44 (0.068)
Shock × (b) 0.091
Female (0.069)
Shock × (b) 0.016
Non-cyclical industry (0.072)
Shock × (b) -0.048
Never unemployed (0.089)
Shock × (b) 0.050
Low county unemployment (0.070)
Shock × (b) 0.058
High financial literacy (0.119)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 1088 1124 1106 1124
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of the learning rate from the professional forecasts
for different groups. All specifications control for the respondent’s prior belief, age, age
squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a
bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure of
the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats
as well as interactions of the prior with the dimension of heterogeneity and dummies for
the dimension of heterogeneity. The outcome is the difference between the posterior
belief measured in the main study and the prior belief. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A11: Learning rules: Heterogeneity by education
Updating (high educ) Updating (low educ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shock 0.276∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.058) (0.095) (0.063) (0.087) (0.125)




Shock × -0.213∗∗ 0.061
Follow news (0.105) (0.146)
Follow news 0.653 4.715
(3.221) (4.942)
Prior -0.255∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.171∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.261∗
(0.047) (0.069) (0.095) (0.067) (0.096) (0.145)
Observations 797 797 797 327 327 327
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates of the learning rate from the professional forecasts
and how it depends on the strength of the prior separately for individuals with a college
degree (columns 1 to 3) and individuals without a college degree (columns 4 to 6). All
specifications control for the respondent’s prior belief, age, age squared, a dummy for
females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies
for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial
literacy as well as a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats. Specifications
2, 3, 5 and 6 also control for interactions of the prior with the dimension of heterogeneity.
The outcome is the difference between the posterior belief measured in the main study
and the prior belief. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at
10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A12: Extrapolation to personal unemployment expectations: Heterogeneity across
demographic groups (IV)
Personal unemployment (percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posterior: Recession (a) 0.219∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.096 0.154
(0.073) (0.078) (0.071) (0.105)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.188
High education (0.129)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.132
High earnings (0.135)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.050
Age>44 (0.149)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.072
Female (0.138)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.765 0.744 0.272 0.352
Observations 1123 1123 1123 1123
First stage F-stat (a) 54.66 48.23 50.62 28.15
First stage F-stat (b) 75.12 71.87 68.29 69.42
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the like-
lihood of a recession on people’s perceived chance of becoming personally unemployed
for different demographic groups based on specification 4. All specifications control for
age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at
least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a mea-
sure of the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for
Democrats as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A13: Extrapolation to personal unemployment expectations: Heterogeneity ac-









Posterior: Recession (a) 0.174∗∗ 0.213 -0.101
(0.086) (0.149) (0.216)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.179 -0.343 -0.072
Non-cyclical industry (0.133) (0.254) (0.403)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.962 0.523 0.610
Observations 1087 1088 1087
Panel B: Personal
unemployment history
Posterior: Recession (a) 0.478∗∗ 0.713∗∗ -0.676
(0.220) (0.355) (0.426)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.450∗ -0.767∗∗ 0.617
Never unemployed (0.230) (0.377) (0.475)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.684 0.671 0.773
Observations 1123 1124 1123
Panel C: County
unemployment
Posterior: Recession (a) 0.233∗∗ 0.176 -0.510∗
(0.097) (0.164) (0.270)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.253∗ -0.214 0.653∗
Low county unemployment (0.139) (0.239) (0.382)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.845 0.829 0.597
Observations 1105 1106 1105
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the like-
lihood of a recession on expectations about the personal job situation for groups with
different exposure to risk based on specification 4 that are underlying Figure 2. All spec-
ifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for
respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region
of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans
and a dummy for Democrats as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct.,
and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A14: Extrapolation to mean expected earnings growth conditional on working at
the same job: Heterogeneity across demographic groups (IV)
Earnings growth: Mean (percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Posterior: Recession (a) 0.013 0.031 0.016 -0.066∗
(0.028) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.046
High education (0.040)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.097∗∗
High earnings (0.043)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.077∗
Age>44 (0.043)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.098∗∗
Female (0.043)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.249 0.060 0.082 0.214
Observations 1118 1118 1118 1118
First stage F-stat (a) 52.66 47.32 50.07 28.02
First stage F-stat (b) 74.26 71.38 67.37 68.92
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the likeli-
hood of a recession on people’s perceived chance that national unemployment will increase
for different demographic groups based on specification 4. All specifications control for
age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at
least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a mea-
sure of the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for
Democrats as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A15: Effects of recession expectations on national unemployment expectations:
Heterogeneity (IV)
National unemployment (percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Posterior: Recession (a) 0.671∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.155) (0.147) (0.239) (0.169) (0.340) (0.186)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.395
High education (0.263)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.393
High earnings (0.284)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.385
Age>44 (0.312)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.272
Female (0.282)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.223
Non-cyclical industry (0.275)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.298
Never unemployed (0.371)
Posterior: Recession × (b) 0.032
Low county unemployment (0.267)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 1088 1124 1106
First stage F-stat (a) 54.66 48.23 50.58 29.03 49.47 14.58 37.18
First stage F-stat (b) 74.95 71.75 68.18 69.22 67.85 69.25 68.07
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the like-
lihood of a recession on people’s perceived chance that national unemployment will in-
crease for different groups based on specification 4. All specifications control for age, age
squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bach-
elor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure of the
respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats
as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A16: Recession expectations and mean inflation expectations: Heterogeneity
Inflation:
Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Posterior (a) 0.032 0.026 0.006 -0.023 0.006 0.028 0.043 0.037
(0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.044) (0.027) (0.075)
Posterior × (b) -0.035
High education (0.035)
Posterior × (b) -0.027
High earnings (0.035)
Posterior × (b) 0.016
Age>44 (0.038)
Posterior × (b) 0.065∗
Female (0.037)
Posterior × (b) 0.025
Non-cyclical industry (0.038)
Posterior × (b) -0.018
Never unemployed (0.048)
Posterior × (b) -0.057
Low county unemployment (0.036)
Posterior × (b) -0.032
High financial literacy (0.085)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.920 0.969 0.474 0.111 0.325 0.635 0.603 0.778
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1085 1121 1103 1121
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the likeli-
hood of a recession on people’s mean inflation expectations based on specification 4. All
specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for
respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region
of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans
and a dummy for Democrats as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct.,
and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A17: Recession expectations and inflation uncertainty: Heterogeneity
Inflation:
Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Posterior (a) -0.026 -0.023 -0.016 0.023 0.027 -0.016 -0.009 -0.086
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.032) (0.024) (0.073)
Posterior × (b) 0.057∗
High education (0.029)
Posterior × (b) 0.065∗∗
High earnings (0.031)
Posterior × (b) 0.056∗
Age>44 (0.031)
Posterior × (b) -0.031
Female (0.030)
Posterior × (b) -0.033
Non-cyclical industry (0.031)
Posterior × (b) 0.027
Never unemployed (0.036)
Posterior × (b) 0.028
Low county unemployment (0.030)
Posterior × (b) 0.120
High financial literacy (0.083)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.134 0.062 0.095 0.690 0.821 0.541 0.350 0.087
Observations 1121 1121 1121 1121 1085 1121 1103 1121
Notes: This table displays IV estimates of the effect of posterior beliefs about the likeli-
hood of a recession on people’s inflation uncertainty based on specification 4. All spec-
ifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for
respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region
of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy, a dummy for Republicans
and a dummy for Democrats as well as dummies for the dimension of heterogeneity. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct.,
and *** at 1 pct. level.
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B.3 Robustness
Table A18: Robustness experiment 3: Learning rates
Updating Posterior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shock 0.342∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.216∗∗















Prior -0.135∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.067) (0.038) (0.047)
Observations 499 499 499 298 402
Sample T5,T15 T5,T15, T5,T15, T5, T5,T5b,
T30,TA,C T30,TA,C T30,TA,C TA,C C,Cb
Notes: The table shows results on the updating of recession expectations from robustness
experiment 3 conducted on MTurk. The sample consists of the following groups: T5 (most
optimistic forecast), T15 (mean forecast), T30 (most pessimistic forecast), TA (5 perc.
num. anchor), C (control), T5b (T5 without prior) and Cb (control without prior). TA
is used as an additional control group in specifications 1-3. Specifications 1-4 control
for dummies for the included treatment arms as well as the respondents’ prior belief
and confidence in the prior. All specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy
for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor degree and
dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence. “Confident” takes value one for
respondents saying that they are “very sure” or “sure” about their prior estimate of the
likelihood of a recession. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance
at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Table A19: Robustness experiment 3: Changes in confidence
∆ Confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any info 0.235∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.082)
















Observations 501 501 501 233 287
Sample T5,T15 T5,T15 T5,T15 T5,T15 T5,T15
T30,TA,C T30,TA,C T30,TA,C T30 T30
Notes: The table shows results on changes in confidence in recession expectations in
response to the provision of information from robustness experiment 3 we conducted on
MTurk. The sample in specifications 1-3 consists of the following groups: T5 (most
optimistic forecast), T15 (mean forecast), T30 (most pessimistic forecast), TA (5 perc.
num. anchor) and C (control). Specifications 4 and 5 only use groups T5, T15 and
T30. All specifications control for the respondents’ prior belief, confidence in the prior,
age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at
least a bachelor degree and dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence.
“Confident” takes value one for respondents saying that they are “very sure” or “sure”
about their prior estimate of the likelihood of a recession. The outcome variable is the
change in confidence standardized by mean and standard deviation of confidence in the
prior. The individual-level learning rate used in specification 5 is winsorized at the top
and bottom 5 percent. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance
at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Posterior: Recession 0.459∗∗∗ -0.005∗
(0.071) (0.003)
Panel B: IV
Posterior: Recession 0.669∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.296) (0.012)
Observations 303 301
Mean dep. var. 36.79 0.06
SD dep. var. 25.58 0.95
First stage F-stat 13.98 13.98
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates based on specification 2 (Panel A) and IV esti-
mates based on specification 3 (Panel B) of the effect of recession expectations on expec-
tations about national unemployment and firm profits from robustness experiment 3 we
conducted on MTurk. The sample consists of the following groups: T5 (most optimistic
forecast), T15 (mean forecast), T30 (most pessimistic forecast). In the IV specification
the posterior is instrumented with the signal (5, 15 or 30) that the respondent received.
All specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy
for respondents with at least a bachelor degree and dummies for the respondent’s Census
region of residence. The outcome in column 2 is z-scored using the mean and standard
deviation in our sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance
at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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Demand Treatment 3.662 -0.092 -0.021
(3.460) (0.147) (0.104)
Anchoring -0.018 -0.070 -0.135
(3.526) (0.142) (0.108)
Observations 296 301 301
Notes: This table displays treatment effects of receiving a “demand treatment” (de Quidt
et al., 2018) or receiving an irrelevant numerical anchor from robustness experiment 2 we
conducted on MTurk. In the demand treatment respondents are told: “In this experiment
people are randomly assigned to receive different instructions. We hypothesize that par-
ticipants who are shown the same instructions as you report more optimistic expectations
about the US economy.” The irrelevant numerical anchor is given as follows: “We would
like to provide you with some information about the share of illegal immigrants in the
United States. According to the Department of Homeland Security, 3 percent of the total
U.S. population are illegal immigrants.” The outcomes in columns 2 and 3 are z-scored
using the mean and standard deviation in our sample. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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B.4 Additional results




















First stage F-stat 56.30
Panel C: Effect of
news consumption (OLS)
Follow news 0.521 -0.980
(follow-up) (1.048) (0.886)
Observations 736 736
Notes: The table shows OLS estimates based on specification 2 (Panel A) and IV esti-
mates based on specification 3 (Panel B) of the effect of recession expectations on people’s
self-reported news consumption. Panel C shows OLS regressions of updating on people’s
news consumption between the main survey and the follow-up. All specifications control
for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for respondents with
at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a
measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy for Republicans and a
dummy for Democrats. The outcome in column 1 is z-scored using the mean and standard
deviation in our sample. The outcome in column 2 is the difference between the prior and
the posterior in the follow-up. The outcome in column 3 is the difference between the
posterior in the main survey and the posterior in the follow-up. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Weighted results
High Recession 11.805∗∗∗ 10.758∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 4.856∗∗ -0.190∗∗ 0.229 -0.135 -0.336 0.034 2.039∗∗ -0.239∗∗ -0.143
(1.721) (1.814) (0.085) (1.937) (0.081) (0.292) (0.085) (0.355) (0.224) (0.878) (0.097) (0.110)
Panel B: Unweighted Results
High Recession 10.203∗∗∗ 9.128∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 5.467∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ 0.146 -0.127∗∗ -0.130 0.021 1.150∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.147∗∗
(1.169) (1.390) (0.057) (1.344) (0.056) (0.181) (0.058) (0.203) (0.137) (0.685) (0.059) (0.070)
Observations 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1121 1124 1118 1118 1123 1124 733
Notes: The table shows reduced form estimates of the effect of the random treatment
assignment on expectations about macroeconomic and personal outcomes. All specifi-
cations control for age, age squared, a dummy for females, log income, a dummy for
respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies for the respondent’s Census region
of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial literacy as well as a dummy for
Republicans and a dummy for Democrats. Outcomes in columns 3, 5, 7, 11 and 12 are
z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the main sample. Robust standard




C.1 Amazon Mechanical Turk
Below we describe the participant pool from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an
online labor market which is increasingly used to conduct experimental research (Cavallo
et al., 2017; D’Acunto, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Roth et al., 2019). Below we discuss
some advantages and disadvantages of using MTurk.
Advantages
• There is by now increasing evidence suggesting that the quality of answers on MTurk
is highly similar, if not better, compared to those of laboratory samples. Further-
more, Coppock (2018) provides evidence that experiments conducted on MTurk
lead to similar conclusions compared to experiments conducted on nationally rep-
resentative samples. He conducts 15 replication experiments and finds a very high
degree of replicability of survey experiments.
• The samples recruited from MTurk are highly diverse in terms of backgrounds which
is important for studying heterogeneity of treatment effects.
• MTurk allows researchers to replicate findings quite easily.
Disadvantages
• One worry about MTurk samples is related to the fact that participants are highly
experienced in taking social psychology surveys and economic experiments using
experimental games to measure social preferences. We believe that this concern is
mitigated in our setting as not many experiments exogenously manipulating expec-
tations about the macroeconomy have been conducted on MTurk.
• Researchers have argued that participants on MTurk may be particularly prone
to experimenter demand effects (Berinsky et al., 2014). However, recent evidence
suggests no differences in response to experimenter demand among respondents
from MTurk compared to respondents from representative online panels (de Quidt
et al., 2018).
Sample criteria We recruit participants currently living in the United States who have
completed at least 500 tasks with an overall rating of more than 95 percent.
C.2 Imputation for heterogeneity analysis
We elicit people’s personal unemployment history in the follow-up survey and the
variable is missing for respondents we could not re-contact. When we examine hetero-
geneous effects of recession expectations according to previous unemployment we rely on
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an imputation procedure. Specifically, we estimate a logit model of the effect of dum-
mies for age brackets, dummies for brackets of tenure, an indicator for credit constraints,
and log liquid assets on the likelihood of having never been unemployed on the sample
of 731 respondents who answered to this question in the follow-up. All of the included
co-variates have high predictive power and 80 percent of the respondents in the follow-up
are classified correctly by the model. We use the coefficient estimates to make an out-of-
sample prediction of having never been unemployed for the 393 respondents who did not
complete the follow-up, which we use in our analysis.
D Updating rule and benchmarks
D.1 Bayesian learning rule
In this subsection we derive the linear learning rule estimated in section 3.2. We are
interested in individuals’ beliefs about the probability of a recession, and how they are
updated in response to receiving the view of a professional forecaster on this probability.
Priors about a probability are usually modeled as following a beta distribution, which is
bounded to lie in the interval [0, 1] and is fully described by the parameters a > 0 and
b > 0. We therefore assume that our respondents’ subjective probability distributions
over the probability of a recession follow beta distributions:
θi ∼ Beta(ai, bi) (5)
Under quadratic loss, agents should report the mean over their individual-level prob-
ability distribution when making a forecast. We therefore assume that people’s self-
reported priors are the means over their subjective probability distributions:




The larger the sum ai + bi, the more concentrated will be the distribution. ai + bi
can therefore be viewed as a measure of respondent i’s confidence in his or her prior. We
assume that the respondents treat the professional forecasts as if they were the outcome
of a Bernoulli trial with n1 “successes” and n0 “failures”. That is, we assume that the
respondents perceive that the expert has a sample of n = n0 + n1 observations available





Under these circumstances, the posterior will again follow a beta distribution with
the parameters c and d where ci = ai + n1 and di = bi + n0. The reported posterior will
be the mean over this probability distribution:
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posteriori = E[θi] =
ai + n1
ai + bi + n
(8)
Under these assumptions the observed updating rule will be the following:
posteriori − priori =
n
ai + bi + n
(signal− priori) (9)
This learning rule gives five key predictions: i) the learning rate will be in the interval
[0, 1]; ii) the larger the perceived precision of the forecast (or the “sample size” that the
expert is perceived to have available), n, the larger will be the weight that is put on the
forecast; iii) the higher the confidence in the prior, ai + bi, the lower will be the learning
rate; iv) people’s confidence in their posterior, ci + di, must be at least as large as their
confidence in the prior; and v) the individual-level learning rate will be positively related
to the change in confidence, n. It should be noted that the variance can take the highest
values in case a = b, but it is not mechanically linked to the individual-level mean.
D.2 Benchmarks for estimated learning rate
In this subsection we provide benchmarks of the estimated learning rate that we would
expect under different assumptions on i) how our respondents interpret the single forecast
they receive and ii) their beliefs about the information that is contained in professional
forecasts relative to the information contained in their prior. It is useful to assume
that respondents hold beliefs about the information contained in the average professional
forecast, and use the provided signal to form a belief about the average forecast.
First, if people misperceive the signal as the average professional forecast despite
the wording of the experimental instructions, the learning rate should only depend on
their belief about the precision of the average forecast: i) if respondents believe that
the average SPF forecast is the best available forecast and is not yet fully incorporated
into their priors, and that there is no useful private information in their priors, they will
fully update towards the signal; ii) if they believe that the average professional forecast
contains no relevant information that is not already incorporated into their priors, the
estimated learning rate will be zero; iii) if respondents think that there is some relevant
information in the professional forecast that is not already incorporated into their priors,
and that there is some relevant private information in their priors, the learning rate will
be γ with 0 < γ < 1.
Second, if all respondents are able to deduce the average professional forecast from
the provided biased signals, there will be no identifying variation in the signal left. The
estimated learning rate will then be zero regardless of how respondents would learn from
the average professional forecast.
Third, if respondents treat the forecast they receive as a (potentially biased) noisy
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Table A24: Benchmarks for estimated learning rate














Information not yet in
prior, no private info 1 0 β1
Information not yet in
prior, private info γ 0 β2
No information not
yet in prior 0 0 0
Notes: This table provides benchmarks for the estimated learning rate we would expect
under different corner cases regarding i) the respondents’ interpretation of the forecast
(columns) and ii) the respondents’ belief about the information that is contained in the
average SPF forecast relative to the information in their prior (rows).
signal about the average professional forecast, they will put lower weight on it relative to
the case where they misperceive it as the average forecast and 0 < β2 < β1 < 1 as well
as 0 < β2 < γ < 1.
Our estimated learning rate of 0.318 therefore implies that i) not all respondents
deduce the average professional forecast from the provided signal and ii) that the respon-
dents believe that there is at least some useful information in the average professional
forecast that is not yet incorporated into their priors. In robustness experiment 3 we ran
on MTurk we estimate learning rates from individual professional forecasts of 5 and 30
percent of 0.229 and 0.346, and a learning rate from explicitly providing an average fore-
cast of 15 percent of 0.447, significantly different from the learning rate from the 5 percent
forecast (Table A18). This is consistent with the idea that respondents understand that
an individual forecast is a more noisy signal than the average forecast.
Our estimated learning rates from professional forecasts are within the range of esti-
mates in related literature. For instance, Armantier et al. (2016) document that house-
holds put a weight of 0.393 on the average professional forecast about inflation when
revising their inflation expectations. Coibion et al. (2018a) find a larger learning rate
from inflation forecasts among firms in New Zealand of 0.691. Coibion et al. (2018a) do
not measure how firms’ expectations respond to the provision of professional forecasts
about economic growth. However, across their information treatments they find that
firms hold stronger priors about GDP growth and unemployment than about inflation.
In the context of households’ house price expectations, Fuster et al. (2018) estimate a
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learning rate from professional forecasts of 0.328 in a setting where survey respondents
are allowed to choose the type of information.
E Additional evidence
E.1 Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Expectations
We confirm the external validity of the findings of greater pessimism and higher dis-
persion of beliefs among consumers than among professional forecasters using data on
the probability of an increase in aggregate unemployment estimated by respondents in
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and by respondents to the New York Fed’s
Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE). While professional forecasters in the SPF have
to assign probabilities to different brackets in which the unemployment rate over the next
calendar year could be on average, respondents to the SCE are asked about the probabil-
ity of an increase in unemployment over the 12 months after the survey. To make these
two numbers as comparable as possible, we focus on the SPF waves conducted in the sec-
ond quarter and the SCE waves conducted in May. Figure A.19 plots distributions of the
forecasts in the SPF and the SCE in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016. Summary statistics
are shown in Table A25. In each year, the median consumer is more pessimistic than
the median professional forecasters, and the interquartile range (IQR) of the professional
forecasts is smaller than the IQR of the predictions by the consumers.
E.2 Beliefs about insurance within the firm
Our evidence that the subjective likelihood of a recession has a negative causal effect on
people’s expectations regarding the evolution of firm profits relates to a recent literature
that has established that firms provide their workers with substantial insurance against
shocks (Fagereng et al., 2017a,b). In line with this, our respondents think that part of
a macroeconomic downturn would be absorbed by lower firm profits. Moreover, we ask
our respondents whether they think that their employer’s profits, hiring decisions and
firing decisions depend on how the aggregate economy is doing. Workers believe that
their employer’s firing decisions are less dependent on the state of the aggregate economy
than their employer’s profits (Figure A.20). This highlights that workers believe that
their employer provides them with a certain degree of insurance against macroeconomic
shocks. In addition, our respondents believe that their employers’ hiring decisions are
more dependent on the aggregate economy than their employers’ firing decisions. This
is consistent with empirical evidence showing that the job-finding rate behaves more
pro-cyclically than the separation rate (Shimer, 2005).
In addition, we examine heterogeneity in the effect of recession expectations on per-
sonal unemployment expectations according to a subjective measure of the degree to
which our respondents are insured against macroeconomic shocks by their employers. We
construct this measure as the difference in the respondent’s agreement that his or her
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Figure A.19: Unemployment predictions in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and














































































Notes: This figure displays distributions of the perceived probability of an increase in
aggregate unemployment over the next year among professional forecasters in the SPF
(left) and among consumers in the SCE (right) for the years 2014 until 2016. The data
from the SPF are from the waves conducted in the second quarter of the year and refer
to expectations about average unemployment over the next calendar year. The data
from the SCE are from the waves conducted in May and refer to expectations about
unemployment 12 months after the survey.
employer’s profits depend on the aggregate economy, and that the employer’s firing deci-
sions depend on the aggregate economy.3 We rescale this measure to lie between 0 and 1.
Respondents who report a lower degree of insurance through their employer extrapolate
more strongly from recession expectations to personal unemployment expectations (Table
A26).
3 We neglect people working for the government in this exercise.
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Table A25: Unemployment predictions in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the
Survey of Consumer Expectations
Mean SD Median IQR Min. Max. Obs.
2014
SPF 18.54 17.91 10.25 25.00 0.00 70.00 38
SCE 38.55 23.37 40.00 30.00 0.00 100.00 1272
2015
SPF 27.74 22.83 21.00 30.00 0.00 96.00 37
SCE 34.63 22.44 30.00 35.00 0.00 100.00 1268
2016
SPF 37.61 20.54 29.00 39.50 0.00 80.00 36
SCE 39.56 21.98 30.00 40.00 0.00 100.00 1258
Notes: This table displays summary statistics of the perceived probability of an increase
in aggregate unemployment over the next year among professional forecasters in the SPF
and among consumers in the SCE for the years 2014 until 2016. The data from the SPF
are from the waves conducted in the second quarter of the year and refer to expectations
about average unemployment over the next calendar year. The data from the SCE are
from the waves conducted in May and refer to expectations about unemployment 12
months after the survey.



















































My employer's firing depends
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My employer's profits depend
on the aggregate economy.
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of beliefs about how firms’ firing decision, hiring
decisions and profits depend on how the aggregate economy is doing.
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Posterior: Recession (a) 0.526∗∗ 0.900∗∗ 0.692
(0.266) (0.428) (0.700)
Posterior: Recession × (b) -0.822 -1.443∗ -1.376
High firm insurance (0.527) (0.822) (1.359)
Pr(a+b)=0 0.306 0.220 0.347
Observations 639 640 639
Notes: The table shows IV estimates of heterogeneous effects of recession expectations
on individuals who perceive a high and a low degree of insurance through their employer
based on specification 4. All specifications control for age, age squared, a dummy for
females, log income, a dummy for respondents with at least a bachelor degree, dummies
for the respondent’s Census region of residence, a measure of the respondent’s financial
literacy, a dummy for Republicans and a dummy for Democrats as well as dummies for
the dimension of heterogeneity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes
significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level.
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